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When an individual learns that his income is being subjected to or
threatened with double taxation,1 he usually goes to a lawyer to find
out whether the taxing states2 are overreaching themselves. So far as
strict jurisdictional rules go, this hope is often disappointed. But
under present circumstances the inquiring client may be given the
cheering information that public interests are arrayed on his side and
that one or the other of, or perhaps even both, the states concerned will
voluntarily do something to lessen his troubles. The great ebb of
wealth which has turned so many of the larger European nations from
creditors into debtors has forced these nations to -face the necessity of
readjusting their fiscal systems to attract foreign capital. For the
present, the United States holds the opposite position. Our interest
lies in planning and executing a policy which will encourage foreign
investment by American business men. An important item of govern-
mental policy in both the European and the American positions will be
common-sense limitation of taxes upon the profits of international
transactions. And it is well for us to study two sides of the question.
Some day the financial tide may turn. If it does, we should be fore-
armed by knowledge of the practical inducements to offer investors
from abroad.
This paper, therefore, begins by outlining briefly such jurisdictional
limits as tend to defeat or curtail double income taxation, and continues
with a summary of the principal voluntary limitations practised or sug-
gested in the British Empire and the United States. It bears, of course,
upon both international and interstate property ownership and commer-
cial dealings. It does not, however, consider the double taxation of
corporate income. That is a special problem, .ecause the artificial
creation and existence of corporations render them peculiarly vulnerable
to excise taxes.
I
RELIEFS DEPENDING UPON LIMITATIONS OF JURISDICTION
It is best to move from the known to the unknown, opening with a
Only a little ingenuity is needed to conjure up cases of triple or even quadruple
taxation of income. -But the double tax is bad enough without further refinements
of fiical torture. The term "double taxation" is used colloquially throughout this
article. Some authorities distinguish double taxation from duplicate taxation on
the ground that both parts of a double tax must be levied by the same state. This
distinction is not generally respected and serves no particularly useful purpose in
the present connection.
'For convenience, the term "state" when used herein uncapitalized refers to any
state or nation. When capitalized, it refers to one of the United States.
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concise statement of the jurisdictional principles controlling the old
familiar personal, property, and excise taxes.3
(i) A state (meaning by this term not only a nation but also any
of our forty-eight States) may impose a personal tax upon any person
domiciled in its territory. A nation may also impose such a tax upon
any of its citizens or subjects, irrespective of his domicile.4 A personal
tax based upon nationality may probably be measured by the entire
wealth of the taxpayer, no matter what its nature or where it happens
to be situated. A personal tax based purely upon domicile may be
measured by the entire wealth of the taxpayer, excluding foreign realty;
our States must exclude also certain personalty having an independent
foreign situs.
(2) Quite apart from questions of nationality or personal domicile,
a state may levy property tax upon all land and chattels situated within
its boundaries, and also upon such intangible property as in contempla-
tion of law possesses a local situs within these boundaries.
(3) A state may tax by way of excise the privilege of acting within
its boundaries or taking benefits from its laws.
From this summary, it is obvious that even in the old days there were
many possibilities of double taxation where a state line fell between a
taxpayer's domicile and his property or business. But comparatively
lax administration greatly diminished the risk in practice. The modern
income levies are administered impartially and on the whole with strict-
ness. So, if the foregoing rules apply to them, they are bound to result
in many overlapping assessments. How far can the rules be accepted
still, and in what respects and why must we depart from them?
One plain and relevant ground of distinction between the income
tax and the earlier taxes on persons and property lies in the fact that a
stream of income cannot be measured at a single instant. Its accrual
and receipt involve a time element-a space as distinguished from a
point. The former practice was to assess persons and property on a
given day, and the resulting tax was usually either valid or invalid as a
whole. When dealing in terms of income, neither state nor taxpayer
can rest comfortably upon such static principles. Each party must
trace the jurisdictional conditions throughout the taxable period. Not
infrequently situations arise under which the adversaries must divide
'See as general authority for the following paragraphs of the text Professor
Beale's clear, comprehensive, and concise analysis in Jurisdiction to Tax (1919)
32 HARv. L. REV. 587. Occasional departures from these rules occur. Take, for
example, Alaska Packers' Association v. Hedenskoy (1920, C. C. A., 9th) 267
Fed. 154, certiorari denied (1920) 254 U. S. 652, 41 Sup. Ct. 149; the case is
keenly analyzed in NoTEs (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rav. 542, 543.
'Professor Beale's article referred to by the preceding note does not cover this
point explicitly. See, however, the same author's later article on The Jurisdiction
of a Sovereign State (923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. 241, 252. Authority is scanty, but
there is little or no reason to doubt the soundness of the statement in the text.
See last reference, infra note 16.
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the bone of contention. Thus courts are enabled in some degree to
prevent both tax dodging and double taxation.5
Passing beyond this clear difference, one finds that the furious battle
of definition in and about the Pollock case6 has shrouded the income tax
with a haze of mystery from which it is only slowly emerging. There
have been and apparently still are persons who think this tax sui
generis-who contend, for instance, that a state may validly assess
income only when its source is situated and its recipient is domiciled
within that state's borders.7  At the other extreme we find eminent
authorities resolutely trying to replace mystery with too great simplicity
by seeking to identify the income tax with some single aspect only of
old-fashioned taxation The United States Supreme Court would
stuff it into a show case labeled "Excise."" Massachusetts judges
would tear this label off and replace it with one of their own reading
'This possibility of doing justice has not yet been fully worked out. Adminis-
trative officials having to do with income taxes feared that where a State's juris-
diction was made to depend upon domicile, at any time during a period of say six
months, double taxation was certain to occur if persons moved in from another
State with a similar jurisdictional rule. 13 National Tax Association, Proceedings
(192o) 278. It was therefore advocated that a single day should be picked out
and unanimously agreed upon as the sacred moment for determining jurisdiction.
But in Hart v. Tax Commissioner (i92I) 24o Mass. 37, 13z N. E. 621, the six-
month rule received a heavy blow. In NOTES (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 876, the
belief is expressed that the protection here given will be broadly extended.
Another case involving a refinement of the problem is now pending before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. New York by its Laws, 1922, ch. 425,
has adopted an express provision covering change of domicile during the tax year.
Under the Federal Revenue Act of 1921, Act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat at
L. 227), a one-day rule has been promulgated. Regulations 62 (1922) art. 313.
But it is not altogether easy to find an adequate statutory basis for this rule.
6Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct 673;
s. c. (1895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 912.
'Mr. Justice McReynolds may have entertained this theory. He took no part
in DeGanay v. Lederer (1919) 250 U. S. 376, 383, 39 Sup. Ct 524, 526, where the
court sustained a tax upon the income of a foreigner derived from securities lodged
in the United States. He dissented in Shaffer v. Carter (1920) 252 U. S. 37, 59,
4o Sup. Ct 221, 228, which sustained an Oklahoma tax on the income of a non-
resident from Oklahoma property. He concurred only in result in Travis v. Yale
& Tozwte Mfg. Co. (1920) 252 U. S. 6o, 82, 4o Sup. Ct. 228, 233, where a New
York tax upon the locally earned income of non-residents was overthrown solely
because these persons were discriminated against in the matter of exemptions.
He dissented in Maguire v. Trefry (192o) 253 U. S. 12, 17, 40 Sup. Ct. 417, 419,
where a Massachusetts tax on the foreign income of a resident was sustained.
'Bruslaber v. Union Pacific Ry. (1916) 24o U. S. I, 16, 17, 19, 36 Sup. Ct. 236,
241, 242. The fact is that "excise" as here used comes from words which meant
not a specialized kind of tax but any kind of tax. See the history of the term in
the New English Dictionary (Oxford, 1888-). Besides, under the Federal Consti-
tution "excise" may well include taxes which would elsewhere be classed simply
as personal. Thomas v. United States (19o4) 192 U. S. 363, 370, 24 Sup. Ct 305,
306.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
"Property Tax." 9 But, going back to the less clouded vision manifest
before the battle of 1895, we find in such cases as State Tax on Foreign
Held Bonds ° plain enough recognition that an income levy may under
varying circumstances be identified with any of the three standard
taxes. Moreover, the present day Supreme Court does not hesitate tojustify imposition of federal tax upon local property income of a non-
resident alien by arguments which sustain a property tax and nothing
else."- Likewise the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in time
of need supports the Massachusetts tax by personal tax arguments.12
The long and short of it is that we are coming to recognize the income
tax not as a new kind, but as a new method, of taxation. When we
apply this method to a resident or a citizen, we are dealing with a mani-
festation of the personal tax; when we apply it to foreign-owned local
property, with a manifestation of the property tax; when we apply it
to a business activity, with a manifestation of the excise tax. This
being so, we are driven to assume-subject only to the point of divided
jurisdiction indicated above-that wherever double taxation was possible
under the old system, it is equally possible and decidedly more likely
under the new. We need focus attention only on those points at which
double taxation used to break down or be challenged, to see whether
the new system in any way mends these jurisdictional gaps.
(I) THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF INCOME TAXATION
It has frequently been said that a tax upon property and a tax upon
its income are not to be differentiated in legal effect. If so, it is a possi-
ble consequence that where a state would have to exclude certain
property in fixing the measure of a personal tax, it must likewise exclude
income from that property. The HARVARD LAW R viEw' 3 seems to
have taken the position that this argument will not pass muster. But
some of us still cannot forget the hard-fought Pollock case. Had the
contention been valueless, the courts which considered Maguire v.
Tax Commissioner14 might have simplified their opinions. There, how-
ever, they saw fit to swing the case on the point that the principal from
which the income sprang was of such a nature that it had not acquired,
'The idea was put strongly in Opinion of the Justices (1915) 220 Mass. 613,
624, io8 N. E. 570, 573, and emphatically repeated in Hart v. Tax Commissioner,
supra note 5, at p. 39, 132 N. E. at p. 622.
"0 (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 300, 319. The companion case of Pittsburg, Fort
Wayne & Chicago Ry. v. Pennsylvania (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 326, note, directly
compares income and ordinary property taxes.
' DeGanay v. Lederer, supra note 7, at p. 382, 39 Sup. Ct. at p. 526.
'Maguire v. Tax Commissioner (1918) 230 Mass. 503, 512, 12o N. E. 162, 166.
13 NOTEs (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 876, 877, note ii.1 Supra note 12; also, s. c. (1920) 253 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417. For a recent
authority possibly relevant and of more explicit character, the reader may consult
Gillespie v. Oklahoma (1922) 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct 171. See (1922) 35
HARV. L. REv. 889.
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and very likely could not acquire, a situs of its own adequate to free the
beneficial owner from personal assessment on account of it. Assuming,
then, that the question is still open, let us see where the argument for
non-taxability leads if it be accepted.
As to income taxation by our States, the result is reasonably simple.
States could no longer measure the tax on locally domiciled persons by
the amounts of income which these persons received from their foreign
realty or from such foreign personalty as comes under the rule of Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky.'5 As to federal income taxa-
tion, the result is more complicated. Since the decisions sustaining the
excise on foreign-built yachts,' it has seemed at least likely that the
Supreme Court would uphold a federal personal tax, otherwise valid,
on a citizen, even if measured by his foreign real estate or chattels.
From that surely would follow the validity of a tax measured by the
income of the same property. One ground might be that the United
States extends at least potential protection to all foreign property of
every citizen. But this sounds like logic to support a property tax
rather than a personal tax. The latter is based on ability to pay, not
upon a quid pro quo in the way of property protection. Yet the
peculiar tax under consideration is not strictly a property tax, for plainly
it could not be enforced in rem against the foreign property if the owner
declined to make voluntary payment. However, one must not forget
that the United States can give more extensive personal protection to
citizens than can any State. Hence it would seem that an assessment of
this kind could become the basis of something in the nature of a personaljudgment against even a non-resident citizen, which-if he continued
recalcitrant-could be satisfied out of any property of his within this
country's boundaries. Of course it would not enable the federal
government to pursue property or the owner abroad, since no other
nation will lend its courts for the enforcement of our tax laws.
Note that the logic of the last point fails to cover a personal tax
measured by the income of a locally resident alien derived from foreign
property. The United States will not give such property or its income
any sort of protection abroad. Hence with respect to him it might
consistently be held that the national income tax should have no greater
measure than the income tax of the State within which he is domiciled.
Unluckily for the taxpayer, the matter does not stop here. Unless
such action runs foul of a local constitutional provision, it is perfectly
possible for a state to tax the income of a resident's foreign property
after that income has been remitted to the domiciliary jurisdiction, even
(1905) 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36.
'
8 Particularly United States v. Bennett (1914) 232 U. S. 299, 304, 34 Sup. Ct.
433, 435. See also Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gloucester (1917) 228 Mass. 519, 526,117 N. E. 924, 927. Since the text above was written, it has been held in Cook v.
Tait (1923, D. Md.) - Fed. -, that the federal tax on the foreign income
of non-resident Americans is valid. The opinion covers the ground fully.
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though it was temporarily exempt from income tax at the instant it
arose.17 Whether to call this a personal or a property tax is debatable.
It might well be justified under either head.
(2) THE PROPERTY ASPECT OF INCOME TAXATION
As suggested in the last paragraph, a tax may fall upon income as
property. That calls for skilful work by the administrative officials.
It is like shooting birds on the wing. Special firearms are required and
special retrievers are needed to trace and bring in remittances. At
best, an efficiency rather far short of one hundred per cent. is to be
expected. Besides, the bird may under some circumstances prove to be
shot proof. Witness the dividends paid five or six years ago in the
shape of tax exempt Liberty Bonds.1 8  This pleasant mixture of
patriotism and thrift failed only because the federal tax was not imposed
on income. When an income levy is a property tax, it is distinctly more
simple to lay it on the capital from which the income springs, using the
latter as a measure and not a subject of taxation. This changes wing
shooting into pot-hunting, with the target often quite stationary. 9
We are then brought to a sure and usually easy question of jurisdic-
tion over property. All doubts which have been settled by practice
under the general property tax are as fully settled for this purpose.
One common and difficult case is necessarily resurrected, however.
May we tax interest paid a foreigner20 on an obligation which, if
embodied in a specialty, is embodied in one kept outside the taxing
state? When the interest is payable at a bank or financial house inside
that state taxability may be established. But when payable abroad, none
of our States may tax it, unless State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds2' has
been more undermined than most critics suspect. Although a legisla-
ture may attain a roughly similar result by taxing the obligee's rights
", Prior to 1914 the British income tax distinguished between foreign income of
British residents according to whether it was or was not remitted to the United
Kingdom. Testimony of Sir Charles Campbell McLeod and Sir Algernon F. Firth
before the Royal Commission on the Income Tax (1919-192o). i Royal Comm.,
Evidence (1919) par. 1882, 1886; ibid. par. 1913 et seq.; 3 ibid. par. 8oo6. The
evidence before and the report by this Commission contain one of the most
enlightening discussions of double taxation to be found anywhere.
" See "Tax on Liberty Bonds" (1917) 31 Opinions of Attorney General, 125;
Treasury Decisions, No. 2512. Corporation Trust Co., Fed. Inc. Tax Service
(1923) secs. 1102-1112. The reasoning of this opinion is somewhat hazy.
" It has been intimated that constitutional objections make the tax on income as
such easier for many American jurisdictions. NOTES (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 876,
878. But even this tax is not free from such objection, and the balance of con-
venience is all in favor of the tax on property measured by its income.
' Here and generally throughout the article, "foreigner" is used as a simple
term to designate a person not so bound to the taxing state by either nationality
or domicile as to be subject to its personal taxes. "Paid" is used in the sense of
"paid or accrued."
(1873, U. S.) 15 Wall. 300.
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in any domestic property mortgaged to secure the obligation, other
circumstances are likely to make such a property tax inadvisable or
improper.
It is still doubtful whether State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds indi-
cates a principle which restrains federal taxation. What might have
been a decisive case 22 served merely to confuse the issue. The Supreme
Court split into two groups over the Civil War tax measured by the
interest paid to foreign holders of bonds issued by domestic "corpora-
tions. One group, consisting of three justices, would have treated the
tax as being on the obligees or the obligations. A single member of
this group would have held the tax invalid. The other members of the
first group went the striking length of saying that no matter how out-
rageous the tax might seem under general principles of jurisdiction, it
did not contravene any express limitation on the federal taxing power,
and hence the court could not effectively pronounce it invalid 23  The
second group, a majority of the court, held that the tax was valid as
being levied on the obligors rather than on the obligees or the obliga-
tions.
There the matter stands, so far as Supreme Court decisions go. But
there has been one significant English decision.2 4 An American rail-
road company issued to a British trustee an obligation payable in
London as to both principal and interest. The contract with the trustee
expressly provided that the law of England should govern. A third
party to this contract was a British surety for due performance by the
obligor. Under the federal revenue act the American company was
compelled to impound at the source a certain percentage of its payments
to London. It remitted the remainder only, claiming that this fully
discharged its obligations. The trustee thereupon sued the surety for
the deficit. The court allowed recovery, saying pithily that there was
nothing in British statute or common law (or, it might have added, in
common sense) which enabled the American corporation to satisfy part
of its debt to the English obligee by payment to our federal treasury.
This seems entirely sound. It means fundamentally that our govern-
ment lacked jurisdiction to impose the tax in question. The test could
be made complete if the surety would sue the railroad company in the
United States for reimbursement. I am advised that no such suit is
contemplated. Surely, though, the point will come up sooner or later
if our present tax policy continues, and when it does arise may well
result in favor of the foreign obligee.
United States v. Erie Railway Co. (1882) io6 U. S. 327, i Sup. Ct 223.
Doctors still disagree on the question. See Treasury Decisions, Nos. 2o17, 2313,
2317, and 2324.
'Their opinion was for some reason separately printed and will be found in
io6 U. S. 703, 1 Sup. Ct 223, 226.
"'Indian and General Investment Trust, Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd. [1920]
i K B. 539, 548-551.
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One other matter bearing upon the property tax aspect of income
levies should be noted and considered, although it seems forejudged.
Most income taxes are progressive, the rate advancing with each acces-
sion to the taxpayer's net income. The justification is that as an indivi-
dual's revenues rise higher and higher above the amount needed for
bare subsistence, he can spare a constantly increasing proportion of the
excess for the public needs of the state. Such an argument, finding its
sole basis in personal ability, is properly applicable only to a personal
tax. What sustains a property tax is an equivalent rendered in the
shape of protection. But our assumption here is that no personal
jurisdiction exists. And it is the proud boast of our law that the
widow's mite receives the same degree of protection as the millionaire's
safe-deposit box. How, then, can the state argue its right to tax the
latter at a higher rate per unit of value? Should not the progressive
principle be confined strictly to those income taxes which have a personal
basis ?
Right or wrong, it appears almost certain that no constitutional
principle may be successfully invoked to force such a result. The case
of Shaffer v. Carter 5 seems quite in point, for the tax there was pro-
gressive. Then, too, the Supreme Court has already held that a State
may levy upon the transfer of the local property of a non-resident dece-
dent a progressive inheritance tax gauged as to its rate by the entire
quantity of the dead man's property, wherever situated.26  This goes a
step beyond what is necessary to maintain a progressive property tax on
or measured by income. While the inheritance tax is of course pecu-
liarly favored as being an excise, one feels that the case last mentioned
will to some extent bind income as well, particularly as the United
States Supreme Court so often calls income taxes "excises." Indeed,
one is left wondering whether we might not perhaps run up the rates
of our taxes on the local income of non-resident aliens by reference to
their aggregate income from every source.
(3) THE EXCISE ASPECT OF INCOME TAXATION
For present purposes, an excise is to be deemed valid if the act in
respect of which it is imposed takes place within the limits of the
taxing state, and if the measure of the tax is reasonable.2 1 Certainly
where the laws deal with a profitable act the amount of the profit is a
reasonable measure. But in those very important cases of local produc-
tion or local sales by foreigners, i is often difficult to fix the situs of the
taxable transaction and to allocate the profit.
(1920) 252 U. S. 37, 39, 45, 40 Sub. Ct 221, 223.
'Maxwell v. Bugbee (1919) 250 U. S. 525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2. Mr. Justice Holmes
led a vigorous dissent, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Van Devanter and
McReynolds joined.
'In some States constitutional provisions restrict excise taxation to certain
classes of acts. It is not within my province to discuss these local provisions.
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(A) Sales not Connected with Previous Production. A non-resi-
dent sells shares of stock in the New York stock exchange. New York
can of course make him pay a fixed excise upon the transfer, without
regard to his profit or loss. He has employed a very special localized
facility. It is equally obvious that if he made a profit he might, so
far as jurisdiction goes, be forced to pay on the spot an additional
excise measured by that profit. It would not matter where or how he
acquired the stock. But the difficulties of thus collecting this tax
without delaying a peculiarly swift-moving business are too formidable.
So, whether a foreign seller disposes of his goods on the exchange or
in a place less subject to report and regulation, the income excise
normally rests upon a periodical return made by himself or by an agent
or broker of his. Opportunities for evasion are manifest, but aside
from the administrative difficulties thus created the tax is not puzzling.
Nor is its measure in any great doubt. So long as the case involves
nothing beyond acquisition followed by sale, the state in which the
sale takes place may and usually does levy upon the entire profit,
whether the acquisition occurred locally or abroad .2  Yet it must be
admitted that no trader can keep the wolf away from his door unless
he knows how to buy cheap as well as sell dear. One might argue that
in instances of foreign acquisition part of the ultimate profit should be
attributed to the act of purchase and should be taxable only where that
occurred. The obvious failure of this argument to command practical
acceptance can be0 taken with calm philosophy, since in the converse
situation there is little inclination to attempt a tax on the basis of a
shrewd purchase alone.
29
It is assumed above that the taxing state is the unquestioned "place of
the sale." That phrase will bear analysis. At its strongest, it means
that the contract is made and delivery and payment also occur where
the excise is imposed. Needless to say, international and interstate
traders have carefully exploited the situation with an eye to minimizing
their expenses. They have found that it is often perfectly possible to
close the contract, make the delivery, and collect the purchase money
at their own domiciles or business seats. When this is done under
proper legal advice, no tax on account of profits becomes payable at
what we may term the ultimate destination of the goods. The proce-
dure was developed by an interesting line of British decisions, culminat-
ing for the moment in a case decided by the House of Lords last year
which brought down with a crash one deliberate attempt to extend the
scope of income tax.30 The same principle underlies many of our own
cases defining the term "doing business."
This rule is put clearly in Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 5, sec. 217 (e).
Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (192o) par. 54 (a).
'F. L. Smidth & Co. v. Greenwood [1920] 3 K. B. 275; S. C. [1921, C. A.] 3
K. B. 583; s. c. [1922, H. L.] i A. C. 417. The significance of this decision
appears from paragraphs 47-49 of the Royal Commission's Report, supra note 29,
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(B) Sales Coupled with Production. Suppose that a non-resident
alien trader produces or finishes goods ir. the United States, exports them
to England, and there sells them at a profit. If we try to tax this man,
he makes three arguments-two legalistic and one purely practical.
He points first to the stock dividend cases as holding that income must
be derived from property before it can be taxed.3 1 Now, says he, the
obvious effect of these adjudications is to postpone the levying of a tax
until the occurrence of the final act of profit realization. That act is
the sale. But as the sale is in England, the United States has entirely
lost its jurisdiction and therefore loses the chance of adding to its
revenue. 2 Parenthetically, he remarks that we cannot prevent the loss
by imposing an export tax, because our federal constitution forbids.
3 3
His second theoretical argument is that even if we are allowed to tax
him on this transaction, the increase in value from the work on the
goods is exactly offset by the cost of the work, so that the tax is nil."'
And third, he asks how our officials intend to exact the tax without
crippling commerce by holding an inquest on every outgoing shipment.
It is easiest to answer these objections in reverse order. As to the
practical difficulty of applying the. tax, the proper and common-sense
reply is that we are not striving for unattainable perfection and will
impose the levy only upon those who make a fairly regular business of
local production followed by export for sale abroad. Such people are
reasonably sure to have local agencies, local plants, and local stocks of
goods which guarantee the collectability of taxes assessed on an annual
basis. As to the point that the cost of the finishing processes equals
and offsets the new value thereby added, we can answer that this simply
is not so. Why is the work done, unless it puts the exporter in a posi-
tion to make something over and above his expense? He might, of
course, miscalculate and come out sometimes either just even or with a
loss to meet, but the bankruptcy court yawns for him if he does so too
often. The real manufacturing profit in the case of articles having a
regular market is the difference between the price at which the finished
goods would be sold by a manufacturer and the aggregate of what has
been paid for the original materials and for the various processes to
at p. ii. Since this article was written, the case of Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v. Commonwealth (1923) - Mass. - , has unsettled the situation in the
United States.
' Eimer v. Macomber (1920) 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct 189, 193.
"See the opinion of Acting Attorney General Frierson under the Revenue Act
of I918 (40 Stat at L. 1057), in the course of which he says: "No income is
derived from the mere manufacture of goods; before there can be income there
must be sale . . . ." 4 Cumulative Bulletin (1921) 280, 282 (3-21-14Ol; Treas.ry
.Decisions, No. 3111).
Constitution of the United States (1789) art Is secs. 9 and io. A. G. Spald-
ing & Bros. v. Edwards (April 23, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1922, No. 710.
"Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (ig2o) par. 54 (c), repels one form of
this argument
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which they have been subjected.35 Where the market is irregular, and
disposition by a manufacturer would involve very special elements of
salesmanship, it is more difficult to phrase a rule for determining' the
profit, but that does not mean that the profit is non-existent.
Now as to the first objection based on the proposition that the profit,
if any, is not realized until sale and therefore arises beyond the taxing
jurisdiction of the United States. Observe that a distinction is to be
taken. The taxpayers who have successfully sheltered themselves
behind the necessity for realization have been those whose profit arose
or was to arise simply out of the passive ownership of property, and
not out of any sort of activity normally subject to an excise tax.36 In
the immediate case the taxpayer actively carries on a business and thus
joins the excisable class. Surely the ultimate manufacturing profit
is a reasonable measure of taxation, no matter where it is realized.
What complicates the problem, of course, is that the buying, the
selling, and the manufacturing profits are realized simultaneously and
in an undivided lump. But this is not a fatal complication. A practical
illustration botlY of the calculation and the temporary suspension of such
profits can be found in the operations of the United States Steel Cor-
poration. A series of subsidiary companies carry the metal forward
from the mines to its myriad final forms, the various concerns being
separated largely under functional standards. Their consolidated
financial statement shows the accrued though still unrealized profits
held pendant but ready calculated for distribution when the final step
is taken.37
Despite this illustration, it is probably far beyond the powers of any
tax gatherer, and even further beyond the patience of the average
foreign trader, to dissect every transaction and segregate each kind of
profit. Hence the courts tend to sustain methods by which fair general
approximations are attained. For example, the profit attributable to
manufacturing might be deemed to bear the same proportion to the
total profit that the taxpayer's manufacturing property in the United
States bears to his total manufacturing and distributing property both
here and abroad. More elaborate mathematical formulae are in actual
use.38  It is also possible to give the taxpayer at least a choice between
"Ibid. par. 55.
"Observe the statement in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (i9io) 220 U. S. 107, i5o,
31 Sup. Ct 342, 348, that the Pollock case, supra note 6, construed the income tax
of 1894 as being direct "because it was imposed upon property simply because of
ownership."
" Twenty-first Annual Report of United States Steel Corporation for Fiscal
Year Ended December 31, .922, 6 note, 8 note, 23, 33 note, and 35. Naturally this
process of allocation is much easier where the dealings are betveen legally distinct
corporate units than where every stage takes place in a single business concern.
' For a decision sustaining in a particular instance a formula like that described
above, see Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254 U. S. 113, 41
Sup. Ct. 45. The taxpayer was incorporated, but this did not affect the principle
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two evils, by letting him elect to pay a tax on turnover if he does not
wish to make the disclosures and perform the calculations required for
compliance with one of the tax formulae. 39
Assume now a variation of the case just put. The non-resident starts
with his raw material or unfinished goods as before, but instead of
doing the manufacturing or finishing operations himself has them done
for him by an American manufacturer. Here, unless the foreigner
makes himself a principal by supervision over the details of the
processes, it is not altogether easy to see that he brings himself within
reach of an excise tax.40 Note, though, that even if he personally
escapes tax, manufacturers who work for him must pay on the profits
they realize from the work. Hence the public revenues are not alto-
gether slighted.
Finally, reverse the point of view and suppose that our non-resident
alien manufactures goods abroad and sells them here. This throws us
back upon the latter part of the discussion under sales not involving
previous production, with a certain additional question about the amount
of the profit to be taxed. For even if the sale were unquestionably
local to the United States, it might be urged that only the merchandis-
ing profit, and none at all of the manufacturing profit, should be liable
to assessment by us. It would seem, however, that while approximate
separation of manufacturing and merchandising profits may be
permitted for the purpose of swelling the revenues in the state where
only the manufacturing occurs, it will not be compelled for the purpose
of diminishing the revenues in the state where only the sale occurs.
Tax law is full of similar failures in reciprocity.
41
of the case. Regulations 62 (1922) art. 327, sets out the federal formula. See
also ibid. art. 327 (a). For New York's formula, consult N. Y. Personal Inc.
Tax Regs. (1921) art. 457. This precise problem cannot arise under the Massa-
chusetts personal income tax law, but that State has an elaborate formula for
corporations. Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 63, sees. 38, 41, and 42. Compare the
New York corporation tax in Laws, 1917, ch. 726, sec. 214; amended by Laws,
1920, ch. 640, and Laws, 1921, ch. 705, sec. 4. See also the pamphlet issued by the
Wisconsin Tax Commission entitled Wisconsin Income Tax Law (5th ed. 1922)
38 et seq., and, upon the same point, F. D. Strader's remarks in x3 National Tax
Association, Proceedings (1920) 318. Two cases of interest are Westby v.
Bekkedal (192o) 172 Wis. 114, 178 N. W. 451; and People, ex rel. Stafford, v.
Travis (3921) 231 N. Y. 339, 132 N. E. 1O9.
'Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (192o) par. 5o, mentions this alternative.
Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921 ch. 63, sec. 42, gives corporations, and N. Y. Personal Inc.
Tax Regs. (1921) art. 47o, gives individuals, a vaguer alternative. Where it can
be shown that one of the tax formulae causes actual injustice, relief may be given.
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra note 38.
4'The British Royal Commission, however, wished to tax the foreigner in this
situation. See their Report (192o) par. 54 (c).
,' Thomas Reed Powell gives an interesting analysis of the matters just covered
by the text. See his Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv. 634, 658 et seq.
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(4) SUMMARY
A summary of the discussion thus far is short and sad. The tax-
payer who owns property or transacts business in a state or states other
than that of his domicile is only too likely to find his income doubly
taxable. The domiciliary state can in one way or another levy a
practically universal personal assessment; the foreign states can largely
overlap this broad tax by assessments on the property or excise bases.
Even the progressive or surtax feature may be duplicated.
IT
VOLUNTARY RELIEFS FROM DOUBLE INCOME TAXATION
The question of voluntarily granted exemptions from double income
tax is well covered by the various situations in the British Empire and
the United States. The choice of the United States for discussion
needs no remark or explanation. The reasons for choosing the British
Empire are equally persuasive, if not so obvious. The income taxes
in the mother country, the Dominions, and the Colonies are cast on
familiar models, easily comparable to our own. Moreover, in the
Empire we find a great variety of conditions and fiscal needs, and a
broad diversity of relations between the member states. Great Britain
is closely linked to every Dominion by both sympathetic ard political
bonds. It is largely through the leadership of the mother country that
the various Dominions are connected with one another. Great Britain
of course holds a controlling and unifying position so far as the Crown
Colonies and protectorates are concerned. 42  The inter-colonial and
inter-dominion relations are often quite distant because of geographical
dispersion. Thus we find here a series of political connections running
all the way from the closest integration or alliance to something little
stronger than bowing acquaintance.
Another important reason for considering the British Empire here
is its recent full investigation of double income tax. A Royal Commis-
sion thoroughly overhauled the British income tax in I9i9-I92o. 43 As
a result of this Commission's report Parliament took certain steps to
prevent burdensome tax duplication between Great Britain and the
Dominions and Colonies. These steps in themselves constituted a sug-
gestion that the Dominions having responsible government should also
act. About two years later an Inter-Departmental Committee on
Income Tax was formed to consider the problems raised by imposition
For a description of the political relations between Great Britain and the other
members of the Empire, consult 2 Lowell, The Government of England (5th ed.
1920) 386 et seq.
' It is impossible in the space available for this article to review the Report of
the Commission, let alone the seven volumes of evidence. The student of double
taxation or of any other income tax problem can multiply my references to this
source.
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of tax in Colonies not possessing responsible government. The Com-
mittee reported in December, 1922.44 Thus the entire field has been
carefully and recently canvassed.
In passing, it may be well to point out two minor matters:
Voluntary alleviation of double income tax is sometimes based upon
considerations of sympathy for individual hardship. This never has
been a very broad basis for relief. Sympathy and taxes do not go well
together. For example, the Massachusetts income tax law originally
exempted income which residents derived from securities held by
foreign administrators, executors, and testamentary trustees, provided
these securities were legally taxed in other states. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court took occasion to term this exemption a just one.4 5 Neverthe-
less after a few years it was repealed, not because the justice of the tax-
payer's case had lessened, or even because a great amount of tax was
being foregone, but because application of the exemption increased
administrative difficulties. Under modern conditions of heavy public
debts, large governmental expenses, and consequent ruthless taxation,
mere individual hardship is less than ever a compelling plea for allevia-
tion.
It is also true that a certain narrow relief from double income tax is
granted purely on the ground of comity. Thus we find the United
States refraining from the taxation of income belonging to foreign
governments, and their ambassadors, ministers, and consuls.
46 This
exemption is not likely to grow and holds no elements of particular
interest.
(I) RELIEF FROM DOUBLE INCOME TAX IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE
The report of the Royal Commission of 1919-1920 is a notably able
document based upon a wide range of evidence from administrative
officials, lawyers, accountants, and business men. Primarily, of course,
this report refers only to the income tax levied and enforced in the
British Isles. But necessarily the recommendations respecting double
tax had a complementary reference to the taxes of Dominions, Colonies,
protectorates, and foreign nations.
Witnesses before the Commission made numerous proposals respect-
ing multiple taxation. Many argued for diminution or abolition of this
hardship within the Empire. Several argued that the relief should be
carried further and applied as between Great Britain and foreign
countries.47 Some in this latter group thought that every foreign
"In subsequent notes this report is termed Inter-Departmental Report.
'Maguire v. Tax Commissioner, supra note 12.
'Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 5, sec. 213 (b) (5), and Regulations 6a
(1922) art 86.
"Among others, 0. E. Bodington, 4 Royal Comm., Evidence (1919) par. 14,256;
S. E. Cash, 5 ibid. par. 16,o84; Sir Algernon F. Firth, 3 ibid. par. 7667; Ernest
C. Pegler, 7 ibid. par. 26,445 et seq.; and A. M. Singer, 3 ibid. par. 5179 et seq.
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country ought to be included. Others ingeniously suggested that
remission should be extended only to those nations which had been the
allies and associates of Great Britain in the world war. The argument
in favor of this latter suggestion was that the great burden of modern
taxation is due to war expenses and that those who had struggled and
suffered on the same side in the conflict should not be made under any
circumstances to contribute doubly to settling its bills."
The action recommended by the Royal Commission referred only to
double tax within the Empire. Naturally one wonders whether it was
not a mistaken policy to confine relief within these limits. Failure, for
example, to enter into a reciprocal arrangement with the United States
bears heavily upon many British business men and may cause them to
change the locations and control of their American businesses so that
Great Britain will entirely lose her taxing power over them. However
this may be, the limited recommendation has full value for general
discussion. The lines of a sweeping exemption from double tax would
follow those of the intra-Empire relief.
At the time when the Royal Commission made its investigation the
condition of income taxation in the British Empire was somewhat
chaotic. Roughly speaking, the United Kingdom levied an income tax
similar to the one now levied by our federal government, except that
non-resident nationals were not taxed on their foreign income. Resi-
dents of Great Britain were taxed upon all their income from whatever
source derived; in addition a tax was laid upon all income arising in
Great Britain irrespective of the recipient's domicile. 49  Some
Dominions and Colonies followed the same practice. But others had
taxes which were much more limited in scope, applying only to income
from local sources. The agitation for relief against multiple or
cumulated taxation had been going on for years. In 1916 "a rough-
and-ready expedient' was tried, in the form of a provision giving
maximum relief amounting at the time to thirty per cent. of the heavy
United Kingdom tax in cases where both this and a Colonial tax were
imposed upon the same income."'
It soon became clear in the hearings before the Royal Commission
that this measure of relief must give way to something better. Various
new schemes were proposed for application throughout the Empire.
They may be listed as follows :52
Sir Algernon F. Firth phrased this view in the paragraph of his evidence
referred to by the immediately preceding note.
' Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (192o) Appx. I, par. 8. This is part of
the report of a sub-committee appointed to take up the question of double tax
within the Empire.
' See supra note 49. Ibid. See also E. R. Harrison's summary in 3 Royal
Comm., Evidence (1919) par. 6337 et seq.
ni Royal Comm., Evidence (igig) Appx. 7 (c). The reference here is to an
historical note on double taxation prepared by the Board of Inland Revenue.
' These proposals are phrased in different order and slightly different form b3
Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (1920) Appx. I, par. 13.
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(a) It was proposed that when income was subject to assessment by
two members of the Empire that state which imposed the higher rate of
tax should collect its full rate and adjust the loss of revenue by payment
to the other state.
(b) It was proposed that throughout the Empire income should
be charged solely or at least primarily in the state where it arose.
Sometimes this suggestion was coupled with a recommendation that the
state of the recipient's residence might make a further charge by way
of personal tax. In all cases it was urged that the aggregate of the
two charges should have a definite limit, several witnesses hoping to
establish an equal tax throughout the whole Empire.5 3
(c) As a modification of or supplement to the immediately preced-
ing suggestion it was proposed that the state of residence might tax
income originating within it and income remitted to it from another
state of origin.
The first proposal broke down thoroughly. There were two principal
objections to its adoption. It was said-and with obvious truth-that
action along such lines "obscures the independent right of taxation
inherent in every State, and may create the false impression that the
State is exempting a class of income which it is in fact charging; or
that it is contributing towards the revenue of another State."54 Official
witnesses also showed that the difficulty of making and executing the
necessary agreements for such a financial adjustment would be con-
siderable.55 Parenthetically it may be observed that such difficulty
between two entirely independent nations would be much greater than
that anticipated between two members of the British Empire.
The second proposal received very vigorous support.5 It repre-
sented an attempt to bring about the general adoption of a system
already employed in many Dominions and Colonies. As the reader will
see later, it now stands a good chance of general adoption so far as
Colonial income tax is concerned. The Commission, however, again
decided adversely, believing that the proposal involved too serious an
infringement upon principles of taxation followed ever since the adop-
tion of the first income taxes. In one most important aspect the
income tax contains an essentially personal element and is to be based
upon ability to contribute rather than upon jurisdiction over income
source. In the particular instance, too, it was of practical importance
that the surrender of tax on the part of Great Britain would have been
extraordinarily large. The investment of British money in the Colonies
is much greater than the investment of Colonial money in the United
Kingdom.
'Two such witnesses were William Mosenthal and Julius Auerbach. i Royal
Comm., Evidence (1919) par. 2168.
"
4Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (1920) Appx. I, par. 19.
E. R. Harrison, 3 Royal Comm., Evidence (1919) par. 6333; compare Dr.
3. C. Stamp, ibid. par. 9826.
' Royal Comm. on Income Tax, Report (1920) Appx. I, par. 21.
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The third proposal did not differ sufficiently from the second to hope
for a better reception.
The Inland Revenue then came forward with a proposal which, after
modification, ultimately carried the day. This proposal as finally
adopted was in essence that where the same income was taxed or taxable
both in Great Britain and in a British possession the mother country
should give up the equivalent of the Dominion or Colonial tax up to
but not exceeding one-half the rate of British tax.5 7 Any further
relief was to be given by the Dominion or Colony concerned. The
foregoing remedial provision has been made a section of the Finance
Act, 1920.5 s
It will be observed that while this suggestion embodied a hint that the
Dominions or Colonies should do something generous no actual string
was tied to it. It will be noticed further that the form of exemption
necessitates identification of the specific income benefited. Under many
circumstances such identification may be very difficult. It may also be
necessary for the taxpayer, instead of taking'his relief by way of anti-
cipatory credit, to secure a refund of part of his tax after payment.
The Royal Commission foresaw both these difficulties, but felt that they
would have to be faced. 9 Here I may well anticipate the statement of
a useful administrative device suggested by the report of the Inter-
Departmental Committee on Colonial income tax.60  This Committee
decided that where such adjustments of exemption had to be made it
would be convenient for the Colony involved to have a tax agent in
Great Britain. Such an agent presumably would have no peremptory
powers, but wherever a taxpayer will lay the facts before him an adjust-
ment can be reached much more easily by conference than by long-
ranged and long-winded correspondence. This seems a sound and
workable scheme for adjustment of many difficulties arising from
attempts to alleviate double taxation. Nearly any taxpayer with a
clear conscience ani a clear perception of his own interests will see that
it is wise for him to deal openly with the tax agent, even though that
agent cannot force him to do so.
We need not trace subsequent proceedings in the Dominion Parlia-
ments. For our purposes it is enough that the Royal Commission
wished the Dominions to bear any residual relief. Parliament's action
appears to be a ratification of this desire.
With respect to the Colonies further developments are more interest-
ing. The Inter-Departmental Committee above referred to has drafted
a model Colonial income tax act. The control of the mother country
over Colonial legislation is such that this act may very well replace those
Ibid. par. 70; ibid. Appx. I, par. 26 et seq.
(1920) IO & ii Geo. V, c. 18, sec. 27.
This is to be inferred from par. 69 of their Report.
OInter-Departmental Report (1922) 16, 29.
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at present in force.61 Hence a brief outline of- its provisions is desir-
able.
To begin with, it is significant that the model act taxes only such
income as arises within the assessing state and such foreign income as is
remitted to that state.6 2 The principle of taxing the person on all his
income from every source is thus abandoned. With respect to double
taxation the relief recommended bears only upon double taxation within
the Empire. As between the taxing Colony and the United Kingdom a
scheme supplementing that recommended by the Royal Commission is
proposed. The Colony is called upon to grant relief "equal to the
amount by Ahich [its] rate of tax .... exceeds half the appropriate
rate of United Kingdom tax," with half the appropriate United
Kingdom rate as a maximum limit.6 3 Thus in the aggregate the indivi-
dual will pay the higher of the Colonial and British taxes, Great Britain
and the Colony sharing the loss fairly equitably. The model act's
clauses dealing with double income tax as between one Colony and
another, or a Colony and a Dominion, produce the same result.64
If general adoption of the model Colonial income tax is obtained, the
British Empire will present an object lesson in the fair adjustment of
double income taxes.
(2) RELIEF FROM DOUBLE INCOME TAX IN THE UNITED STATES
In our own country we find a number of minor reliefs from double
income taxation based upon no very general principle. Non-resident
aliens, for instance, pay no federal tax upon interest from their bank
deposits in the United States, unless they are engaged in business here. 5
Obviously it was wiser to make this concession than to have the deposits
withdrawn and so lose the chance to tax local banks upon such income
as they realize by using foreigners' money. The New York law simi-
larly exempts non-residents, and also exempts them from tax on annui-
ties, bond and certain other interest, and corporate dividends. 66
Neither thus nor along broader lines can the United States display
any such systematic development as that planned and already partly
executed among the members of the British Empire. We suffer from
both lack of uniformity in State taxation and a strong tendency to
ignore foreign taxes or at best to allow them only as deductions from
gross income.
It ought, however, to be realized as clearly at home as it is abroad"r
at2 Lowell, op. cit. supra note 42, at pp. 402 et seq.
2Inter-Departmental Report (1922) 5, 20.
'Ibid. 13 et seq., 31, 32.
14Ibid. 17, 32, 33.
'Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 5, sec. 217 (a) (i).
N. Y. Laws, 1919, ch. 627, sec. 359-3.
'Several witnesses before the Royal Commission spoke with warm praise of our
Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 32, in its bearing upon relief from double taxa-
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that our federal government has treated the international situation with
generous wisdom. The Revenue Act of 1921 frames an income tax
unusually considerate in this aspect. To be sure, this law recognizes
State income taxes only as deductions from gross income and not as
credits on or set-offs against the United States tax.68  But that is fair
enough. The federal government and the States discharge functions
supposed to be supplementary, not overlapping. The taxpayer is
theoretically no worse off when assessed by both these grades of govern-
ment than he would be if he paid a single governing power for the same
service and benefits. A sounder criticism of the Revenue Act of 1921,
although a smaller one, is that we do not follow the general custom of
exempting income of non-resident citizens derived from foreign
sources.
69
The latter criticism may be met rather effectively by the cold-blooded
argument that most Americans are patriotic and that patriotism will
stand a good deal. This sort of thing does not usually kill the goose
that lays the golden eggs. If we slightly overtax a foreigner who
invests money here, he may quite promptly remove his capital and
cause us loss. If we somewhat more heavily overtax a locally resident
alien on his business in the United States, he may move out. Yet until
we overtax a non-resident citizen very heavily indeed he will not cut his
national ties and expatriate himself in order to shake off the burden.
When commenting upon this part of our tax before the Royal Commis-
sion, Mr. E. H. Harrison of the Board of Inland Revenue seemed to
think that non-resident Americans were more likely to save themselves
by tax-dodging than by expatriation.7 0
The excuse even for tax-dodging is comparatively slight. For any
American citizen, resident or non-resident, may credit against the
amount of his federal tax such income and other similar taxes as he
may have paid during the taxable year to any foreign country or to
any possession of the United States.71  There is a reasonable limitation
upon this credit. Its amount may not exceed "the same proportion of
tion. G. M. Edwardes Jones, 3 Royal Comm., Evidence (i919) par. 5210 et seq.
and par. 5379 et seq.; A. M. Singer, 3 ibid. par. 5179; also Sir Frederick Young,
i ibid. par. 948.
' Regulations 62 (1922) art. 131, construing Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 5,
sec. 214 (a) (3).
'Regulations 62 (1922) art. 3, construing the Revenue Act of i921. An excep-
tion is made in the case of certain persons deriving large proportions of their
incomes from possessions of the United States. See Revenue Act of I921, supra
note 5, sec. 262. As originally framed, this relief section was much broader and
was intended to benefit a class defined as foreign traders. The broad provision
passed the House, but fell by the wayside in the Senate.
=3 Royal Comm., Evidence (i919) par. 6299. The writer feels bound to con-
fess that he has heard of several Americans domiciled abroad who have indicated
a desire to trade their original nationality for another one in order to escape tax.
But these cases are seemingly rare.
'Revenue Act of i921, supra note 5, sec. 222 (a) (i).
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the [federal] tax .... which the taxpayer's net income .... from
sources without the United States bears to his entire net income .... "72
A resident alien enjoys the same right in respect of income taxes paid
to a United States possession. He enjoys the right in respect of foreign
nations' taxes only if his own countir allows a similar credit to citizens
of the United States residing therein.73 This limitation seems some-
what harsh. Aliens resident here can exercise little political pressure
upon their home governments. Even the quite large number of
English business men in the United States have been unable to bully
or blarney Great Britain into acceptance of the reciprocity requirement.7 4
To non-resident aliens the Revenue Act of 1921 grants nothing in the
way of tax credit. Here, of course, we show ourselves unwilling to
apply internationally the British intra-Empire arrangement. Possibly
Congress was impressed with the difficulty of allocating a non-resident
foreigner's domiciliary tax in order to allow set-off of an appropriate
part against our own tax.
Our more serious trouble is with interstate assessments. We may
perceive the unsatisfactory condition of State income taxation by
glancing at the laws of Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and New York. To
a considerable extent the Wisconsin tax is based upon the situs theory.
That is, income is assessed if it arises within the borders of Wisconsin
and is exempted if it arises outside.7  The exemption, however, is
much qualified in favor of the taxing State, for residents are required
to include as taxable income many important kinds of foreign receipts.
Except so far as income goes free on the basis of foreign situs, no relief
against double taxation is given, save by a partial deduction of foreign
taxes from gross income for purposes of Wisconsin tax.
In Massachusetts the theory of taxation is domiciliary-quite the
reverse of the Wisconsin theory. No non-resident is assessed on any
income whatever, even though the source be absolutely localized within
Massachusetts boundaries. 76  This clash of theories leads to badly
unbalanced relief. A Massachusetts resident deriving income from
Wisconsin would be taxed in both States. But a Wisconsin resident
deriving income from Massachusetts might well be taxed in neither
State. In the matter of allowable deductions and credits the Massa-
chusetts tax is very complicated.7 7  For present purposes it is sufficient
Ibid. sec. 222 (a) (5).
Ibid. (2) (3). Observe that the effect of the credit when allowed is to sub-
ject the taxpayer to an aggregate assessment equivalent to the higher of the over-
lapping taxes. The same end is attained by the British Empire scheme of reliefs.
But in the case of an American citizen, we are generous enough to let it be attained
entirely at the expense of the United States.
"Regulations 62 (1922) art. 385.
75 1 Wis. Sts. 1921, secs. 71.Ol, 71.02 (3) (c) and (d).
'Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 62, secs. I, 5, 9-14, and 17.
"See Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 62. Throughout the first part these deduc-
tions and credits are scattered helter-skelter.
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to state broadly that Massachusetts allows no credit for foreign income
taxes against the rate of her own tax and also that she allows only to a
partial extent the deduction of foreign taxes from gross income.
New York presents a different tax from those of Wisconsin and
Massachusetts. It proceeds upon a catchall theory reminiscent of the
federal income tax.7 8  But in the matter of tax credits there is a
curious inversion of federal practice. Only non-residents may have
credit for foreign income taxes paid, and not even they except so far as
their states of domicile allow New York residents similar rights.70
Application of the New York credit provision necessarily requires more
or less difficult allocation of taxes. New York does have a consistent
and thoroughgoing scheme for allowing deduction from gross income
of foreign taxes other than income taxes.8 0  A non-resident claiming
such deductions must prove that the foreign taxes are connected with
specific taxable income arising in New York.
Nothing more than the foregoing statement is needed to prove the
confusion, inconsistency, and injustice already created by competing
income laws of the several States. The danger is great that conditions
will become worse rather than better. Lawyers, economists, and tax
officials have perceived this danger and presented through the National
Tax Association carefully thought out proposals for avoiding or alleviat-
ing the burden of double income levies.8' The proposals thus advanced
are based upon scientific separation of the three taxes-personal,
property, and excise. It is proposed that a personal income tax should
be levied on practically all income from every source by the domiciliary
jurisdiction of the taxpayer. This tax is to be progressive. Jurisdic-
tions in which the taxpayer does business are also to levy an income
tax of the excise type at a flat rate. If a taxpayer were domiciled and
also carried on his business in one State he would pay both these taxes
to that State. This system of income taxation is supplemented by a
property tax on tangibles at their situs. The draftsmen of these model
State acts knew only too well the utter failure of previous efforts to
tax intangible property. So they omitted it from the scope of their
property tax.
In an ideal world this plan would be most satisfactory. Though
three-headed like Cerberus, it would be a tame and discriminating
Cerberus. But in the United States it can hardly succeed. To some
extent it would collide with State and federal constitutional provisions.
The current experience of New Hampshire shows that amendment of
N . Y. Laws, 1919, ch. 627, sec. 35r. See also sec. 359, amended by N. Y.
Laws, 1920, ch. 695.
N. Y. Laws, i9ig, ch. 627, sec. 363, amended by N. Y. Laws, 192o, ch. 691.
N. Y. Laws, igig, ch. 627, sec. 36o-3 and ii.
12 National Tax Association, Proceedings (igig) 435-461; 6 National Tax
Association, Bulletin (1921) oo et seq., 129. Further discussion will be found in
14 Proceedings (Ig2I) 65-ioo.
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constitutions has not been reduced to an exact science. We cannot
count upon systematic revisions to take care of these constitutional
hitches. Even if we could, a practical and probably insurmountable
objection would remain. Financial and social conditions vary through-
out the country. Some States are good residence States and some are
not; some States are wealthy, productive, and' fully developed, while
others are comparatively undeveloped and in need of foreign capital. It
is impossible to expect a uniform surrender of jurisdiction over any
sources of taxation."2 Our States always have been and seem likely
always to be stoutly independent about the forms and scope of their
revenue systems. Mere persuasion will not change them. And we
have no such central power as that which exists in the British Empire
to force uniformity despite local sacrifices.
CONCLUSION
Nevertheless it is probably to the method applied in the British
Empire that we must look for betterment of our situation. The problem
in both cases is similar-more domestic than international. As has
been shown, the entering wedge of British double tax reform was a
crude makeshift provision giving only partial relief. Steady pressure
behind this wedge is leading to the acceptance of a comprehensive
system, not based, perhaps, on any theory which would appeal to an
economist, but in the long run likely to prove just, satisfactory, and
serviceable. With the good example of the federal government as a
stimulus, we may find it possible to make headway by working out
something like reciprocal business men's agreements between States
placed in geographical proximity and having community of business
interests. Once that practice starts and succeeds, the very success
should attract additional States. It must be admitted that efforts to
produce similar interstate harmony as to succession taxes have failed
badly.83 But no individual or nation ever got ahead by giving up
hope because of one failure. The importance of income taxation-is
reasonably sure to keep on growing. Political .constituencies,, and in
their wake the least impressionable of hard-headed practical politicians,
must be brought to realize that governmental finances, and for that
matter general governmental success, depend upon a reasonably free
flow of capital. Certainly there can be no such free flow unless we at
least cut some sluiceways in the double banked income tax barriers
along State boundary lines.
W. G. Roylance of North Dakota spoke out bluntly on this point. 13 National
Tax Association, Proceedings (1920) 326.
' Irving L. Shaw in 13 National Tax Association, Proceedings (1920) 307, and
Nichols, Taxation in Massachusetts (1922) 617-6i9.
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